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I Introduction
It is seen as a stylized fact that political budget cycles (PBCs) are context-conditional,
i.e. they do not occur in all countries or under all circumstances. Early on it was argued
that they are more likely to appear in specific country groups (developing countries,
Schuknecht, 1996; or new democracies, Brender and Drazen, 2005). Then the emphasis
shifted to country characteristics like fiscal intransparency (Alt and Lassen, 2006) or the
electoral system (Aidt and Mooney, 2014). Veiga, Veiga and Morozumi (2017) confront
several of these conditioning factors and find that media freedom is key in reducing the
incidence of PBCs. Bohn and Veiga (2017) shift the focus to the economic conditions and
present evidence which shows that recession expectations augment the political budget
cycle.
This paper deepens the analysis of the effect of economic conditions on the PBC. It
argues that entities (e.g. countries, municipalities) with a high stock of debt may end
up with a higher primary deficit in an election year than those with lower initial debt
when a recession is expected (and vice versa for expected booms). This is relevant
for two reasons. First, high debt entities frequently face recessions. Second, the high
deficit outcome may seem surprising because high debt entities are often pressured, if
not obliged, to raise tax or other revenues and cut expenditures in order to produce a
primary surplus or, at least, to dramatically decrease their primary deficit (for instance,
in order to reach a pre-set debt target). During a recession this may not be easy. It may
also not be desirable; standard Keynesian countercyclical policy may be used to alleviate
the macroeconomic consequences of the recession. However, the effort to improve the
primary balance should be at least as strong in entities with a high stock of debt as in
other entities. In fact, this is the (normal) government response to a high stock of debt
in an expected recession in an off-election year. But why then the higher primary deficit
in high debt entities when a recession is expected in an election year?
1
Our answer is very simple and we illustrate it in an opportunistic PBC model which
incorporates boom and recession expectations. Our model shows that an opportunistic
policymaker is immune against debt targets (including a potential reputation loss) when
a recession is expected for an election year. Instead, such a policymaker is concerned
about her electoral prospect which improves if voters can be made to believe in her
competence which, in turn, depends on whether the policymaker is able or not to raise
public services or expenditures by more than what was expected by voters. If that is
so, the higher primary deficit in a high debt entity (in an election year when a recession
is expected) is entirely due to the fact that a government of a highly indebted entity
typically has to employ higher tax rates and, therefore, loses more tax revenue during a
recession. To undo that loss, and still appear competent, an opportunistic policymaker
of a high debt entity has to accept a higher deficit. The opposite argument holds for
expected boom times; an opportunistic policymaker can now plan on using the higher
tax revenues to reduce debt without loosing re-election chances.
Our logic works when excessive debt coincides with higher tax rates. But that is not
guaranteed. In fact, excessive debt may have been produced because tax rates were too
low in the first place. Eventually, excessive debt entities will have to apply high tax
rates to tackle the debt problem. It may be difficult to judge whether an entity is still in
the rapid debt accumulation/low tax rate phase or in the excessive debt/high tax rate
phase. This is so because it is not at all obvious what high tax rates are. At a country
level, for instance, tax rates depend on specific factors like the development of the tax
system, the cost of tax enforcement (which depends, for instance, on the share of the
agricultural sector in total output), or the willingness and ability of policymakers to use
seigniorage.1 At a sub-national level, samples tend to be more coherent, i.e. there are
1 At the country level, it is also very difficult to determine when debt is excessive. First, we would
not be able to avoid having to define excessive debt in an ad-hoc way. For most countries, there are
no legal public debt limits. Even if they exist, they are typically not binding. The EU fiscal rules, for
instance, did establish a limit of 60% of GDP for the gross public debt of member countries, but it was
not binding for entering the Eurozone and only received greater importance with the changes in the
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similar tax rates and similar responses to excessive debt, especially if there are excessive
debt procedures. The Portuguese municipal data employed in this paper satisfies these
conditions. We do not have tax rate data for most of our sample period, but we discuss
in footnote 18 and show in the appendix that fiscal revenues are higher in high/excessive
debt municipalities.
The empirical results, obtained for a sample composed of all Portuguese municipalities
covering the period 2002-2014, robustly confirm the intuition that our model suggests.
Based on our regression results, we illustrate the change of policy in election years with
plots of average marginal effects for the election year, over forecasted growth rates.
Those marginal effect plots show higher primary deficits in high debt municipalities
during expected recession times and lower primary deficits during expected boom times
(compared to low debt municipalities). The difference grows for expectations of more
vicious recessions as well as for expectations of more pronounced booms.
Our result extends the discussion of context-conditionality of political budget cycles. It
shows that excessive debt, if paired with high tax rates, produces even stronger PBCs
during recessionary periods. It captures an important mechanism with significant policy
implications. In particular, it says that it may even be counterproductive to prescribe
a tough medicine (higher tax rates), if the excessive debt entity faces frequent elections
during recessionary periods. Another interpretation relates to the role of constraints for
the emergence of political budget cycles. Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) discuss checks
and balances that serve as institutional constraints for reducing political budget cycles.
This paper argues that the existence of a low debt level is by itself a constraint that
limits political budget cycles (at least during recessionary periods).
rules after the sovereign debt crisis. Second, high debt is less problematic when public debt is held by
domestic residents than by foreign residents. Third, debt issued in national currency is less problematic
than debt denominated in foreign currency. Fourth, while countries that control their monetary policy
have the possibility to monetize debt, those which are members of a monetary union like the Eurozone
cannot do so individually.
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We emphasise recessions and excessive debt as conditioning factors in the paper, but
other conditionalities may also play a role (see reviews by Franzese, 2002, and de Haan
and Klomp, 2013). First, we focus on the aggregate level of fiscal policy in terms of the
primary deficit, but not on particular types of expenditures.2 In a robustness test we
also present results for total expenditures and fiscal revenues. Footnote 19 explains why
they give clues in the direction of the results we obtain for primary deficits. Second and
consequently, we do not account for fiscal conservatism. Given that we find a significant
PBC effect, there is arguably no overall fiscal conservatism as suggested by Pelzman
(1992).3 We can, however, not exclude the possibility that the PBC effect occurs because
policymakers manipulate certain types of expenditures (which we do not distinguish in
the paper) in favour of some key groups of voters.
Our theoretical model, too, does not distinguish between different types of expenditures
or voters. It also presupposes that voters do not behave fiscally conservative, either
because they do not want to or because the manipulation is so effective that it overcom-
pensates any fiscal conservative predisposition. The opportunistic political budget cycle
model we use implicitly assumes that voters, if rational or not, can actually be made
to believe in the higher competence of the incumbent based on fiscal manipulations. It
was Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) and Rogoff’s (1990) idea that utility-maximising voters
should only be concerned about the competence of the policymaker chosen for govern-
ing after the elections. If competence shocks are persistent (usually modelled as MA(1)
shocks), the task of voters becomes a competence extraction task in order to decide on
who to vote for. However, even rational voters can be fooled, if there is some information
2 The notion of cycles in various types of public expenditures is supported by, for instance, Schuknecht
(2000; capital expenditures), Drazen (2001; transfers), Block (2002, visible current expenditures) and
Vergne (2009; subsidies). Cycles in the composition of expenditure are also suggested, for instance, by
Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Schneider (2010) and Aidt and Mooney (2014).
3 And empircally supported by Hayo and Neumeier (2017, for Germany), Drazen and Eslava (2010, for
Colombia), and Brender and Drazen (2008, for a panel of countries). However, Veiga and Veiga (2007)
and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) show that there is no fiscal conservatism in Portuguese municipal
voting.
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asymmetry. In Rogoff’s world, politicians observe their competence skills before voters;
hence we obtain a signalling model. In the Lohmann (1998) and Shi and Svensson (2006)
world, some part of the electorate is uninformed or has some other handicap (in Bohn
and Veiga, 2017, it is inertial growth perceptions). It is important, however, that politi-
cians cannot observe their competence shocks. Hence there is no signalling; instead, the
incumbent will exert some hidden effort to manipulate the outcome of the elections. Our
model is in this latter pure moral hazard tradition.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II lays out the model. Indications on the
solution and the main results can be found in Section III. Section IV describes the data,
the institutional setting, and the empirical model. Section V presents empirical evidence
(including the results of robustness tests) providing support for the main implications of
the theoretical model. Section VI concludes.
II Model
The model combines elements from Lohmann (1998), Shi and Svensson (2006) and Bohn
and Veiga (2017). It captures an economy with n voters and two opportunistic can-
didates, an incumbent and a challenger, who compete for holding office every alternate
period. Each agent’s expected utility depends on the discounted present value of expected
period utilities which, in turn, consist of additively-separable economic and political util-
ities (β is the discount factor; E is the expectations operator). In each period, voters
derive utility from consumption c (u(cs) has the standard concavity properties), from
local public goods L and from political utility θizs (with weight α). Voter i’s ideological
preference or personal sympathy, θi, is uniformly distributed over the interval [-1,1]; z
indicates who is in power (zs = −12 , if a is in power; zs = 12 , if b is in power; without
limiting the generality of the analysis we call a the incumbent and b the challenger). If
her favourite candidate is in power, voter i receives positive political utility; political
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utility is smaller for more moderate voters, i.e. voters with less strong views on the
candidates. Voters vote prospectively in that they choose the candidate who can deliver
the highest expected utility in the future. More moderate voters might, therefore, vote
for the ”wrong” candidate, if they are compensated by higher economic utility. Here is
the voters’ utility function:
U it =
∞∑
s=t
(βi)s−tEt[u(cs) + Ls + αθizs]; s = t, t+ 1, ... ; i = 1, ..., n. (1)
The candidates’ economic utility is the same as voters’. However, candidates only receive
a political (dis-)utility if they are in office: an ego rent and a potential reputation loss,
if they were also responsible for missing pre-set debt target B∗s−1 (see further down) in
the previous year:
V jt =
∞∑
s=t
W js =
∞∑
s=t
(βj)s−t Et[u(cs) + Ls + IsXs − Is−1Isξs(B∗s−1 −Bs−1)2]; (2)
s = t, t+ 1, ... ; j = a, b; Ir =

1 if in power in period r;
0 otherwise.
Everybody’s expected consumption depends on expected after-tax income:
Ekt [cs] = E
k
t [(1− τs)sy¯] = (1− τs)s, k = j, i. (3)
τs is the tax rate. Period-specific expected growth factor shock s captures the deviation
from trend (or previous period or potential) output y¯ which is normalised to 1; s > 1 is
an expected boom; and s < 1 is an expected recession.
The government budget constraint relates primary deficit Ds to the provision of (local)
public goods Ls. It takes into account expected tax revenue τss and the government’s
competence ηjs (see further down):
Ls = τss +Ds + η
j
s. (4)
6
Excessive debt municipalities are obliged to reduce their debt by a certain percentage
every year and may have to apply a particularly high tax rate. Low debt municipalities do
not have such requirements. In a continuous setting, we capture it with two continuous
functions. Here is every municipality’s yearly (period-specific) debt target B∗s (which
depends on the initial level of debt Bt−1):
B∗s = δB
∗
s−1, s = t, t+ 1, ... ; with B
∗
t−1 ≡ Bt−1; (5)
δ = δ(B∗t−1); 0 < δ ≤ 1 for B∗t−1 ≥ 0;
δ(0) = 1 and δ monotonously decreasing.
For the municipalities’ tax rate τs we assume that it is predetermined and – as argued
before – depends on the initial level of debt Bt−1, too:
τs = τ = τ(Bt−1); with τ ′ > 0; τ ′′ < 0. (6)
Given the interest payment on inherited debt level Bs−1 from the previous period, and,
possibly, debt reduction from Bs−1 to target level B∗s the government would normally
be obliged to make a primary surplus. Let’s call it the primary surplus requirement
(component 1) which would imply Ds < 0 and require spending cuts. However, the gov-
ernment may choose to disregard the rules, especially in an election year, and maximise
with respect to the second component, the freely choosable deficit Dfrees .
Ds ≡ (Bs − Bs−1) − rBs−1.
Ds = ((B
∗
s +D
free
s )−Bs−1)− rBs−1;
= (B∗s −Bs−1)− rBs−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
primary surplus requirement
+ Dfrees︸ ︷︷ ︸
freely choosable
;
= δB∗s−1 − (1 + r)Bs−1 + Dfrees . (7)
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As in Rogoff (1990), government competence is modelled as an MA(1) process. However,
Shi and Svensson (2006) suggested that there are always new tasks which do not allow
candidates to know their own competence ηjs in advance:
ηjs = µ
j
s + µ
j
s−1. (8)
Shocks µjt are random variables with mean 0 and distribution function F [µ
j
t ] = F [•].
For simplicity, density function f [µjt ] = f [•] = F ′[•] is assumed to be bell-shaped, but
more general formats would also be possible. Inserting equations (6) to (8) into budget
constraint (4) we obtain:
Ls = τss +Ds + µ
j
s + µ
j
s−1; (9)
= τ(Bt−1)s + δB∗s−1 − (1 + r)Bs−1 +Dfrees + µjs + µjs−1. (10)
TABLE I: The Timing of Events
Time Who does what?
1) Voters i and incumbent a observe:
- the incumbent’s last period skills µat−1;
- the predetermined tax rate τt.
2) Incumbent a observes:
- the temporary debt target B∗t ;
- growth (estimate) t.
Period t 3) Incumbent a:
- chooses primary deficit Dt;
- thereby providing local public goods Lt.
4) Voters i observe:
- local public goods Lt.
5) Voters i :
- form expectations of the incumbent’s current period skills µ̂at ;
- and vote.
Period t+1 The winner of the period t elections takes office, receives an ego rent and suffers a reputation loss,
if she missed debt target B∗t .
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The timing of events is presented in Table I. Elections take place in alternating periods.
At the beginning of election period t, voters and incumbent a observe the realisations
of last period’s skills shock µat−1 and predetermined current period tax rate τt. The
incumbent also observes (period-specific) debt target B∗t and growth shock t which
allows her to decide on the optimal level of freely choosable deficit Dfreet .
4 On this basis,
the government determines the choice of primary deficit level Dt, thereby providing
quantity Lt of local public goods. Voters observe Lt and form expectations of skills
shock, µ̂at , which is, however, affected by their expectations of the growth shock, ̂t,
and of the primary deficit, D̂t. Voters base their decision on whether to vote for the
incumbent on µ̂at because period t skills affect the incumbent’s competence for providing
local public goods in (t+1). Note that voters can make a mistake in their expectation of
the incumbent’s competence for two reasons: (i) they may not be able to fully anticipate
the deficit policy by the incumbent; and (ii) they may not be able to fully anticipate an
imminent economic slump or boom.
In period (t + 1), the winner of the election receives ego rent X. Policy in (t + 1) is
no longer dependent on voting though; hence either policymaker (a or b) will repay the
costly debt as much as possible, thereby cutting the provision of local public goods.5
Voters anticipate this, but can do nothing to prevent it. Note also that the voting
decision in election period t does not extend to considering expected utility in t + 2
4 Voters may or may not observe the debt target and the growth shock (whereas policymakers are
assumed to observe the growth shock correctly). The model is silent (and this does not affect the
qualitative results) on whether their beliefs of expected growth ̂t and expected primary deficit D̂t are
determined on the basis of full or partial information, rationally or not. Those beliefs affect voters’
expectations of the incumbent’s current period skills µ̂at , but the incumbent can only take them as given
values when choosing her optimal policy.
5 We do, however, assume that the government never goes below the period-specific debt target.
B∗t+1 is, therefore, both the lower limit and the relevant debt target for period (t+ 1). Theoretically, it
could namely be optimal to strategically reduce the debt level even further in order to have more room
of maneuver in the next election period (t + 2), although behaviour of this kind may seem unrealistic,
especially when the stock of debt is very high. By assuming the debt target to also be the lower limit
for debt reduction we follow Shi and Svensson (2006); they also rule out strategic behaviour by not
allowing the government to produce negative debt.
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because the MA(1) nature of the competence process makes incumbent and challenger
indistinguishable then. Policymakers do also not include t + 2 in their optimisation
problem when determining the optimal level of Dfreet because they cannot influence
their own utility or boost their re-election chances in t + 2. Hence the model can be
split into cycles of two periods which consist of election period t and off-election period
(t+ 1).
III Model Solution
Given the timing of events and the reasoning for splitting the analysis into 2-period
election cycles the solution is found by studying the incumbent’s utility maximisation
over the cycle including election period t and off-election period (t + 1). Whether the
incumbent receives an ego rent in period (t + 1) depends on the probability of being
elected which, in turn, depends on her election year choice of the optimal level of deficit
Dt, which ultimately depends on the choice of freely choosable deficit D
free
t . The logic of
the model solution is explained here, but details are provided in the appendices. Voters
base their voting decision in period t on a comparison of utilities to be expected from the
incumbent and the challenger in period (t + 1). Utility expected from the provision of
local public goods in (t+1) is affected by the policymakers’ competence (ηjt+1 = µ
j
t+1+µ
j
t)
and individuals’ expectations thereof. Since competence is an MA(1) process, incumbent
a’s period t choice of Dfreet affects what voters expect of the incumbent’s competence
in period (t + 1), whereas nothing is known about the challenger. In Appendix A we
derive an (in our opinion, realistic) condition for a voter to vote for the incumbent
which was already hinted at when explaining equation (1). If the voter shares the
incumbent’s ideology and the incumbent is expected to do at least an equally good job
(Eit [µ
a
t ] ≥ Eit [µbt ] = 0) or if the voter has a different ideology (though not too far on the
other side of the political spectrum) and the incumbent does a great job, then the voter
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will vote for the incumbent:
Et[µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (11)
On this basis, the individual’s probability to vote for the incumbent can be derived
(see the end of Appendix A). The probability for the incumbent to win the election is,
therefore:
Prob
{
[
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
. (12)
Voters extract government competence µat by using the government budget constraint
(9). The true competence is:
µat = Lt − τtt −Dt − µat−1. (13)
Voters can observe the level of local public goods Lt, the tax rate τt, and previous period
competence µat−1. Their perception of government competence is, however, also affected
by their expectation of growth and the government deficit policy. Using equation 13 (see
Appendix B) the perception of competence Et[µ
a
t ] can be expressed as:
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = Lt − τt̂t − D̂t − µat−1 = µat + [τt(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]. (14)
Note that voters overestimate the incumbent’s competence (µ̂at > 0), if the government
can raise the primary deficit above what is expected by voters. This is the standard
manipulation argument. However, if they think the recession is less severe than it actually
is, they underestimate the incumbent’s competence.
Let us now rewrite the incumbent’s probability of winning (12):
Probwin = Prob
{
[
µat + [τt(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
= 1 − F [τt(̂t − t) + D̂t −Dt]. (15)
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If we assumed rational expectations, there could not be any manipulation in the equi-
librium and the probability of winning could not be increased (despite the government’s
best efforts in doing so; as seen in first order condition 17). Under other behavioural
assumptions for voters’ expectations, the probability of winning can be affected by the
incumbent’s choice. For the core result of the paper it does not matter, if the winning
probability can be affected or not. We, therefore, take an agnostic point of view at this
stage, but will discuss the effect of voters’ assumptions when discussing Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1 further down.
The incumbent’s 2-period maximisation problem can now be written as follows (see end
of Appendix B and Appendix C; Xs is kept constant and discount factor β is set to 1
because it is irrelevant for the qualitative properties of the results):
maxDfreet
Eat { u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X }
+ Eat { Probwin [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 +X − (B∗t −Bt)2] }
+ Eat { (1− Probwin) [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1] }; (16)
where Lt = τt +Dt + η
j
t ;
Lt+1 = τt+1 + (δ
2 − (1 + r)2)B∗t−1 − (1 + r)Dt + ηjt+1;
Dt = (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet .
The first order condition (FOC) determines the government’s optimal choosable deficit
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Dfreet
∗
(because the second order condition for an optimum is satisfied):
dV
dDfreet
= 1 − (1 + rt) + F ′[τ(̂t − t) + D̂t − (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet ]
[X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2] = 0;
⇔ rt = F ′[•] [X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2]. (17)
The FOC is staightforward. The interest rate (which is the net marginal loss from
incurring a deficit) must be equal to the net marginal gain from increasing the winning
chances. The latter is the net benefit for the government (ego rent minus reputation loss)
times the marginal increase in winning chances due to the increase in voter-perceived
government competence which is caused by the increase in deficit-financed public goods.
As the FOC defines the equilibrium for any expected growth rate t, we can now study
the effect of (reduced or aggravated) boom or recession expectations:
Lemma 1. - Growth Expectations.
Imminent boom expectations (higher t in equation 16) decrease the government’s choos-
able optimal deficit Dfreet
∗
as well as the overall primary deficit Dt at the equilibrium.
(Recession expectations raise it.)
( i)
dDfreet
∗
dt
= −τ(B∗t−1)t < 0;
( ii)
dDt
dt
=
d[(δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1]
dt
+
dDfreet
∗
dt
= 0− τ(B∗t−1)t < 0.
Proof: Appendix D.
The lemma says that there is a countercyclical policy effect in election years. An oppor-
tunistic government will compensate the tax revenue shortfall due to the recession by
an equal increase in the deficit. Conversely, an opportunistic government can reduce the
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deficit by the amount of additional tax revenue. The motivation is clear, the government
does not give voters reason to believe that it would not be able to provide the same
amount of public goods as without a recession or a boom. Recall that the optimal choice
of public goods and hence of the deficit is already elevated as documented by the first
order condition. The lemma only says that the government does not want to take any
hit to the competence perceived by voters.
Figure I: Expenditure and Revenue
Lemma 1 can be illustrated in a stylized situation. Figure I captures a balanced budget
situation, if output is at trend level. Situations to the left produce a budget deficit, those
to the right a budget surplus. This is so, because we assume that revenues are given by
an upward sloping straight line which is purely determined by economic activity. For
simplicity, there is no countercyclical (Keynesian) response to recessions. Government
expenditures do not respond to output; the government can only change expenditures
discretionarily. Given that set-up, Lemma 1 simply says that an opportunistic govern-
ment which expects a recession will not content itself with the ”Normal PBC” (light
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[green] arrow) because it expects a revenue shortfall of the size of the dark [green] arrow.
It will, therefore, plan on compensating the revenue shortfall by increasing the deficit so
that the no-recession level of manipulated government services can be provided despite
the expected recession (in order to appear competent). The overall manipulation will be
the sum of both arrows.
It is important to note that the result of precisely compensating for the tax revenue
shortfall was obtained on the basis of given voter expectations for growth, ̂t, and deficit,
D̂t. If, for instance, voters were to expect a smaller recession than the government,
then the government would think that it is harder to convince voters of its competence.
Hence the manipulation and the countercyclical policy effect would be increased. If,
however, voters believed that the government would raise the deficit by less than the tax
revenue shortfall, then it would actually be possible for an opportunistic government to
increase the deficit by less. Hence less manipulation would suffice and the countercyclical
policy effect would be reduced. Analogous arguments could be made for expected booms.
The factors determining the magnitude of the countercyclical policy effect were already
studied by Bohn and Veiga (2017).
The focus of this paper is on how the countercyclical policy effect is affected by the level
of pre-existing debt:
Proposition 1. - Excessive Debt.
An increase in excessive debt augments the effect of growth expectations at the equilib-
rium.
ddDt
dt
dB∗t−1
= −τ ′(B∗t−1)t < 0.
Proof: Appendix D.
The proposition says that opportunistic policymakers in entities with a high initial stock
of debt will choose higher deficits in expected recessions and lower deficits in expected
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booms compared to entities with lower debt levels, when they face an election. The
proposition is a direct result of the countercyclical policy effect derived in Lemma 1,
together with equation (6), which is, admittedly, a simple, but also a very plausible
assumption, namely that tax rates are higher in high debt entities. Even if the coun-
tercyclical policy effect were reduced for one of the aforementioned reasons, Proposition
1 would still hold. It captures the testable prediction that highly indebted entities ma-
nipulate fiscal policy, in particular the deficit, more than entities with lower initial debt
levels.
Figure II: Expenditure and Revenue 2
Proposition 1 can be illustrated in an analogous way. Figure II compares the situation
of a low debt and an excessive debt municipality. The low debt municipality is identical
to the municipality from Figure I; thin lines and a normal text font are used. Our
stylized excessive debt municipality is different in two respects (fat lines and italicized
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text [all in red] are used). First, the government revenue line is steeper and above the
line for the low debt municipality. Second, at trend output there is a primary surplus
which is assumed to be used for debt repayment (for simplicity, we assume there is
no debt repayment in the low debt municipality). In normal times, the excessive debt
municipality would also experience a ”Normal PBC” (light [textured] arrow with thick
borders) at trend output. However, the expected revenue shortfall in case of a recession
is much larger (dark [textured] arrow with thick borders). In order to appear competent,
the no-recession level of manipulated government services must be provided despite the
expected recession. Hence an excessive debt municipality must increase the deficit by
more than a low debt municipality. The opportunistic countercyclical policy effect is
thus larger.6
IV Data, Setting, and Empirical Model
This section describes the data, the institutional setting for Portuguese municipalities,
and the empirical model.
Data and Regional GDP Growth Forecasts
The model’s implication (Proposition 1) that the stock of public debt affects the way in
which the government adjusts the primary deficit in response to economic performance
(booms or recessions) is tested using data for Portuguese local governments. Municipal
finance data was obtained from the Portuguese Directorate General of Local Authorities
(DGAL), information regarding the dates of local elections and mayors’ characteristics
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and demographic and economic data from the
National Statistics Institute (INE). GDP data is not available at the municipal (NUTS
6 Average marginal election effects of total expenditures, discussed in footnote 19, suggest that the
opportunistic policy effect might be even larger.
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IV)7 level. Therefore, we collected data for the lowest disaggregation level available –
NUTS III. Since data on municipal debt is only available since 2002, and data on regional
GDP is available from 1991 to 2014, our dataset covers the period from 2002 to 2014.
There are no GDP growth rate forecasts at neither the municipal nor the regional levels.
National 1-year-ahead forecasts, produced by the Portuguese government, are available in
the macroeconomic scenario of the national budget, which is presented to the Portuguese
parliament in October, shortly before the municipalities must also draft their budgets
for the following year. Since the formula-determined transfers that municipalities receive
from the central government are indicated in the national budget, the latter must be
taken into account when elaborating the municipal budgets.
Assuming that mayors form their expectations of next year’s GDP growth rates based
on the government’s forecast of national real GDP growth,8 and information on their
regions’ current and past growth rates, we obtain 1-year-ahead forecasts estimating the
following ARIMAX(2,0,1), i.e. ARMAX(2,1),9 model for the NUTS III GDP growth
rates in each region:
RegGDPt = α0 +α1RegGDPt−1 +α2RegGDPt−2 +α3NatGDPft+ ζt+α4ζt−1, (18)
7 NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided
into three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III
regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV
level. There are 308 municipalities in Portugal, 278 in the mainland and 30 in the archipelagos of Azores
(19) and Madeira (11).
8 The 1-year-ahead GDP growth forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) are also
used in robustness tests.
9 Short-run forecasts are commonly generated using ARIMA and ARIMAX models (see Enders,
2004). ARIMA is a univariate time series model which uses autoregressive (AR) and moving average
(MA) components of the dependent variable to explain or forecast its behaviour. ARIMAX uses the
AR and MA components jointly with a vector X of other explanatory variables. When the dependent
variable is not stationary (i.e., it is integrated), it is necessary to take differences of it in the order of
integration. The strategy suggested by Box and Jenkins (1976) is used to choose the most appropriate
model. Since regional growth rates were found to be stationary, there is no need to take first-differences
of the series. The ARMAX(2,1) specification was the one found to be most appropriate for the majority
of NUTS III regions.
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where RegGDPt is the real GDP growth rate for the region under scrutiny in year
t, NatGDPft is the national real GDP growth forecast for year t (obtained from the
national budget for year t), and ζt is a white noise error term. The predicted values from
the estimation of equation (18) for each of the 25 NUTS III regions10 are used in our
empirical analysis as the regional growth forecasts.11
Institutional Setting of Portuguese Municipalities
Municipalities are the second highest government level in mainland Portugal, just be-
low the national government, and the third in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira,
where there are also regional governments. Regardless of their location, all Portuguese
municipalities are subject to the same laws and regulations, have the same institutional
structure, and have the same responsibilities regarding public service provision: sewage,
distribution of water, local transportation and communication, basic schooling, property
maintenance, promotion of culture and science, recreation and sports facilities, local
health care, social housing, environmental protection, and municipal policing. Regard-
ing the institutional structure, the Town Council (Caˆmara Municipal) holds the executive
power, while the Municipal Assembly holds the deliberative power, approving, among
other things, the municipal budgets and plans of activities. The members of both cham-
bers are elected directly by citizens, who vote on closed party or independent lists of
candidates. The top candidate of the list receiving most votes for the Town Council
becomes the mayor, presides that chamber and plays a leading role in the executive,
having substantial power and autonomy.
10 The results of the estimation of the ARMAX model for each of the 25 Portuguese NUTS III regions
are reported in Table E.1.
11 The accuracy of these forecasts for the period considered in the estimations is as follows: mean
error (ME) = 0.30, mean absolute error (MAE) = 2.04, root mean squared error (RMSE) = 2.65. For
the national forecasts: ME=0.87; MAE=1.37; RMSE=1.68. Larger errors in regional forecasts were
expected, since regional growth rates exhibit larger volatility than national growth rates (the standard
deviations are, respectively, 1.92 and 3.54). Regarding the correlation between actual and forecasted
values, it is 0.66 for regions and 0.67 at the national level. Overall, the accuracy of the regional forecasts
generated by the ARMAX models appears to be quite reasonable.
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Although the financial regime for local governments grants financial autonomy to mu-
nicipalities, allowing them to elaborate and approve their own budgets without needing
approval from a higher-ranked authority, the large majority of municipalities is highly
dependent on grants from the central government or from the European Union (own
revenues account, on average, for just one third of total effective revenues). The munic-
ipal budget is drafted by the mayor’s team, analysed by the Town Council, and finally
approved by the Municipal Assembly, in the last quarter of the year prior to the relevant
fiscal year (which corresponds to the calendar year). As 79% of the mayors are sup-
ported by majorities in both chambers (see Table E.2 in Appendix E), they can easily
get their budgets approved. Municipalities are allowed to run budget deficits, but they
are subject to limits regarding the stock of municipal debt. The current financial regime
(Law n. 73/2013) stipulates that gross debt should not be higher than 1.5 times the
average current revenues of the last three years, and a municipality whose debt is above
the legal limit is obliged to reduce the excess debt by 10 percent each year (which would
correspond to δ = 0.9 in the theoretical model). If gross debt is twice the legal limit,
the municipality is forced to submit an adjustment plan to the Municipal Support Fund
(Fundo de Apoio Municipal).12
Municipal elections were held for the first time in December 1976, following the military
coup of 1974 which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. There were local elections
every three years until 1985, and every four years thereafter (in December until 2001,
and in October since then). Although national legislative elections sometimes occurred
in the same year (at least three months apart though), national, regional, or European
12 Legal debt limits varied over time, with successive versions of the local finance law. The choice of
the limit currently in force is based on an exercise done in 2012 by the Technical Secretariat responsible
for drafting the proposal of revision of the Local Finance Law, of which one of the authors was a member.
The idea was to determine the level of debt (relative to the level of current revenues) that, if surpassed
in the beginning of the 2000s, would lead to clearly excessive debt ten years later. Thus, although this
limit was not adopted during our entire sample period, it can nevertheless be used as reference for the
definition of excessive debt. As a robustness check, other thresholds will also be used in the empirical
analysis.
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elections were never concurrent with municipal elections.
Empirical Model
The first result of the theoretical model regarding how the primary deficit responds to
expected growth rates (Lemma 1) is tested with the following empirical model:
Di,t = β1ElYi,t+β2RegGDPfi,t+β3(ElY ∗RegGDPf)i,t+X′i,tω+νi+σt+ ξi,t, (19)
where Di,t is the primary budget deficit of municipality i in year t in real euros (of
2015) per capita; ElYi,t is a dummy variable that equals one in municipal election years,
and zero otherwise; RegGDPfi,t is the forecast of real GDP growth for year t in the
region to which municipality i belongs (estimated using the ARMAX model of equation
18); Xi,t is a vector of control variables which may affect budget balances; νi represents
unobserved municipality-specific effects; σt represents time-specific effects;13 and ξi,t is
the error term. The forecasted regional real GDP growth rate, RegGDPfi,t is interacted
with ElYi,t, so that we can check if the effects of the expectations for economic growth
in election years are different from those in the other years of the electoral cycle.14
Based on the theoretical model and on previous empirical evidence of PBCs in Por-
tuguese municipalities (e.g., Bohn and Veiga, 2017; Aidt, et al., 2011; Veiga and Veiga,
2007), we expect a positive β1, consistent with higher budget deficits in election years.
Additionally, a negative β3 is expected, given the model’s prediction that expected neg-
ative or unusually low growth rates lead to higher deficits, while positive growth rates
lead to surpluses. The overall election-year effect on the budget balance is given by
(β1 + β3 ∗RegGDPfi,t).
13 Since the election-year dummy would be collinear with yearly dummy variables, we control for time
effects using 5-year period dummies. In robustness tests, we also use 4-year mandate dummies and a
cubic time trend.
14 A similar model was used in Bohn and Veiga (2017). However, there, the focus was on identifying a
countercyclical policy effect in periods with recessionary expectations. Several dummies were employed
to test the effect of recession expectations on the deficit.
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The vector Xi,t includes the following control variables which may affect budget balances:
dependency ratio;15 population density; dummy variables for left-wing and independent
mayors; years in office (of the mayor); a dummy variable, Majority, which takes the
value of one when the mayor is supported by majorities in both the Town Council and
the Municipal Assembly, and zero otherwise.
An extended version of the model of equation (19) tests the theoretical model’s main
prediction that a higher stock of municipal debt exaggerates the government’s primary
deficit response to expected booms or recessions (Proposition 1). This extended version
can be presented as follows:
Di,t =β1ElYi,t + β2RegGDPfi,t + β3ExcessDebt+ β4(ElY ∗RegGDPf)i,t+
β5(ElY ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t + β6(RegGDPf ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t+
β7(ElY ∗RegGDPf ∗ ExcessDebt)i,t + X′i,tω + νi + σt + ξi,t,
(20)
where ExcessDebti,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the gross debt of
municipality i in year t is greater than 1.5 times the average current revenues of the last
three years, and equals zero otherwise. The remaining variables are as described above.
The models of equations (19) and (20) will be estimated by fixed effects, with standard
errors clustered by NUTS III region and year. Descriptive statistics of the variables used
in this paper are presented in Appendix E (Table E.2).
V Empirical Results
Here, we present empirical results to test Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 of the theoretical
model; we also discuss an array of robustness tests.
15 The dependency ratio is the percentage of the population below 15 or above 65 years old. Popu-
lation and population growth were never statistically significant when included, and sometimes caused
problems of collinearity.
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Growth Expectations
The results of the estimation of the model of equation (19) for the primary deficit (in real
euros per capita), by fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by NUTS III region
and year are reported in column 1 of Table II. In order to facilitate the interpretation,
the marginal effects of the election year, over the forecasted growth rates, are illustrated
in Figure III.16 As predicted by Lemma 1 of the theoretical model, expected recessions
(negative growth forecasts) in election years lead to even higher primary deficits, as
local governments will not want to bear the electoral costs of reducing the provision
of local public goods in order to compensate for the lower tax revenues. The effect on
the deficit is positive and statistically significant, except for 4% positive growth. That
is, the primary deficit tends to be higher in election years than in the other years of
the political cycle, for practically the entire range of predicted growth rates. This is
consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g. Bohn and Veiga, 2017; Aidt, et al.,
2011; Veiga and Veiga, 2007) which also found evidence of political budget cycles in
Portuguese municipalities.
The coefficient for regional real GDP forecasts is positive, indicating that primary deficits
are reduced in non-election years when the economy is expected to slow down. This
could be interpreted as precautionary fiscal policy. Note, however, that, as discussed
in the next subsection, the coefficient is much reduced and becomes insignificant in
the specification of column 3 (where the effect is picked up by the interaction term
with excessive debt municipalities). As for the control variables, only the dependency
ratio is marginally statistically significant, with a negative sign, indicating – somewhat
surprisingly – that greater shares of younger and senior population are associated with
lower deficits. However, this also becomes insignificant in the specifications of columns
16 Since only about one percent of the distribution of forecasted growth rates is below -6%, and only
another one percent is above 4%, Figure III only shows the marginal effects for forecasted growth rates
within that interval.
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TABLE II: Countercyclicality in PBCs
(1) (2) (3)
Election year 61.968*** 62.903***
(8.752) (8.304)
Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 4.290** 5.805** 1.166
(2.482) (2.496) (0.694)
Election year * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -14.569*** -12.973*** -7.974**
(-5.387) (-3.137) (-2.553)
Excess debt 23.219**
(2.557)
Election year * Excess debt 2.732
(0.168)
Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 8.976***
(3.481)
Election year * Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -17.149***
(-2.937)
Mayor left -14.473 -12.727 -12.258
(-1.262) (-1.125) (-1.073)
Mayor independent 32.816 37.428 34.976
(1.160) (1.332) (1.233)
Years mayor -0.714 -0.873 -0.825
(-1.201) (-1.318) (-1.393)
Majority 0.194 1.681 0.477
(0.017) (0.150) (0.042)
Dependency ratio -5.123* -2.876 -4.307
(-1.780) (-1.038) (-1.487)
Population density 0.037 0.048 0.035
(1.030) (1.314) (1.019)
Election years - Non-election years 52.656***
(7.982)
Time effects controlled for using: 5-Year Yearly 5-Year
Dummies Dummies Dummies
Number of Observations 4,002 4,002 4,002
R-squared 0.118 0.129 0.124
Notes: Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities and standard errors clustered by NUTS III region and year. T-
statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure III: Average marginal effects of the election year
2 and 3 described below.
In column 2 of Table II, we control for time effects with year dummies, instead of 5-year
period dummies. This has the drawback of forcing the exclusion of the dummy variable
for the election year, but has the advantage of accounting for other events that may have
happened in specific election years. In order to economize space, we do not report the
coefficients for the year dummies. Instead, we test the hypothesis that the effects for
election years are equal to those for non-election years. As shown towards the bottom
of the table, the difference between election and non-election year effects is substantial
(52.66 euros per capita) and highly statistically significant. Thus, our results are robust
to controlling for time in this alternative manner (as well as to mandate dummies as
discussed in the subsection on robustness tests further down).
Excessive Debt
The results of the estimation of the model of equation (20), which takes the municipal
debt stock into account, are reported in column 3 of Table II. Since the interpretation of
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coefficients is not trivial when triple interactions are used, the average marginal effects
of the election year are illustrated in Figure IV, for municipalities with and without
excessive debt (ExcessDebt=1 and ExcessDebt=0, respectively),17 over the forecasted
growth rates.
Figure IV: Average marginal effects of the election year
Both lines are negatively sloped, indicating a negative relationship between deficits and
forecasted growth rates, as shown in Figure III. The larger slope of the marginal ef-
fects line for municipalities with excessive debt is consistent with the prediction made in
Proposition 1 of the theoretical model, namely that, in election years, they are more sen-
sitive to growth expectations than the municipalities whose debt stock is not excessive.18
17 The dummy variable ExcessDebt takes the value of one if the gross debt of the municipality is
above the legal limit of 1.5 times its average current revenues over the previous three years, and equals
zero otherwise.
18 This happens because municipalities with excessive debt tend to have higher tax rates and, there-
fore, suffer greater revenue losses during recessions than less indebted municipalities. Although we do
not have information on municipal tax rates for most of the sample period, and thus cannot test this
relationship directly, we show in Table E.3 that, regardless of the time horizon considered, fiscal revenue
tends to increase more in high debt municipalities (for which we use two specifications, either debt ratios
in the initial period or the excessive debt criterion that is used throughout the paper, also as of the
initial period).
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That is, in an election year, excessive debt municipalities register relatively higher pri-
mary deficits for more negative forecasted growth rates, while they have smaller deficits,
or even surpluses, for higher growth rates.19 Only for expected growth rates between
-1% and 1% it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the primary deficit is the
same for both types of municipalities.
The positive sign of the interaction term between excessive debt and the GDP forecast
in column 3 of Table II may seem counterintuitive. It does, however, follow the precau-
tionary policy logic discussed in the previous subsection. The positive coefficient means
that in an excessive debt municipality a lower deficit is produced in an expected recession
during an off-election year. Recession in an excessive debt municipality implies a larger
revenue loss (see also Footnote 18). Precautionary behaviour then means extra cautious
fiscal policy in an excessive debt municipality.
In order to check for eventual non-linear effects of forecasted regional real GDP growth,
we included a squared term in the model of equation (20). As shown in Figure V, the
effects are similar to those obtained when accounting only for linear effects of forecasted
regional GDP growth; and our conclusions remain essentially the same.
Robustness Tests
The robustness of our main empirical results, shown in column 3 of Table II, was checked
in several ways.20 First, we tried two different definitions of excessive debt: debt ratio
above 2 (debt stock above twice the average current revenues of the last three years); and
debt ratio above its sample median (1.3 times average current revenues of the last three
years). The results, shown in Table F.1 of Appendix F are similar to those of Table II,
19 The graphs of Figure F.1 in the appendix suggest that, in excessive debt municipalities, the higher
deficits in election years with stronger recessions are associated with both an increase in expenditures
and a fall in fiscal revenues.
20 The robustness tests’ results are shown in tables only. Nevertheless, the respective figures are
similar to those shown above; they are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure V: Average marginal effects of the election year (non-linear
GDP growth effects)
indicating that our results are robust to using alternative definitions of excessive debt.
Second, we checked the robustness of the results to slight specification changes: excluding
vector X of control variables; controlling for time effects with 4-year mandate dummies
(instead of 5-year period dummies); and clustering standard errors by municipality (in-
stead of by region and year). Then, we checked if results changed when forecasts of
national GDP growth rates were used instead of forecasts for growth in NUTS III re-
gions. As shown in Table F.2 in Appendix F, the results remain practically the same as
in column 3 of Table II.
Finally, we also checked if the results were sensitive to three sample restrictions: exclud-
ing the 30 municipalities of the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira, as they have regional
governments; excluding 100 municipalities for which formula-determined grants from the
central government are above 50% of total revenues (excluding loans), as these munici-
palities’ revenues are less sensitive to the business cycle than those of local governments
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which rely more on own revenues; and, excluding term-limited mayors (in our sample,
a total of 160, but only in the term leading to the 2013 elections) as they have smaller
incentives to behave opportunistically in election years. Again, the results, reported in
Table F.3 of Appendix F, are similar to those of Table II.
VI Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to show that it makes sense for policymakers of highly
indebted entities (e.g. countries, municipalities) facing an election to raise the primary
deficit beyond what policymakers dealing with a lower stock of debt will do, when there
is a recession (and vice versa for a boom). When tax rates are higher in high debt
entities, the tax revenue shortfall is more significant, but opportunistic policymakers
will try to compensate it in order to avoid giving the impression of being incompetent.
We obtain robust support from our empirical investigation of Portuguese municipalities
that recessions, elections, and high debt form an unholy trinity. This is shown to apply
specifically to Portuguese municipalities, but the theoretical model illustrates that the
underlying mechanism is more generally relevant.
Our finding is important because high debt entities often face recessions and are thus
tempted to manipulate more when there are elections coming up. This may be par-
ticularly relevant for high debt countries, because they often face both recessions and
more frequent elections at the same time. Clear policy conclusions can be drawn from
the theoretical mechanism we suggest. Rules and obligations for the government may
not help much. Effective deficit and thus debt reduction may only work, if voters can
be made fully aware of the (expected) economic conditions; and if their expectations
of government expenditures and services can be sufficiently lowered. This reduces the
magnitude of the competence pretence game the government has to play.
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For Online Publication:
Appendix and Indications for the Referees
The appendix gives indications on the model solution including the derivation of the
lemma and proposition. It also presents descriptive statistics and additional empirical
results.
A Probability of an individual to vote for the incumbent
First, we consider an individual who votes in period t for the politician who can deliver
the highest level of expected overall utility in (t+1). It consists of utility from consump-
tion, utility from the provision of local public goods, and utility from the ideological
alignment with the politician. The individual votes for incumbent a, if
Et[u(c
a
t+1) + L
a
t+1 + αθ
i(−1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when a in power
> Et[u(c
b
t+1) + L
b
t+1 + αθ
i(+
1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when b in power
. (A.1)
Obviously, voters differ in their preference θi for party a and b. Expected consumption
is identical under both politicians, whereas the expected provision of local public goods
is affected by the policymakers’ competence ηjt+1 and individuals’ expectations thereof:
Eit [u(c
a
t+1)] = E
i
t [u(c
b
t+1)] = E
i
t [u((1− τ)t+1)]; (A.2)
Eit [L
j
t+1] = E
i
t [τtt+1 −Dt+1 + ηjt+1]; j = a, b; (A.3)
Eit [Dt+1] = E
i
t [D
a
t+1] = E
i
t [D
b
t+1]. (A.4)
Equation (A.3) says that voters base their expectation of the provision of local public
goods in period (t+ 1) on their belief of the tax revenue in (t+ 1) on the one hand and
the deficit making and competence attributed to the government in power in (t+ 1) on
the other hand. Deficit in (t + 1) is the same under either government, since each one
wants to repay as much as possible of debt (left by incumbent a) above the debt target
in year (t + 1). The reason is that there is no election at the end of that period and
each government wants to start with a clean slate into the next election year (t+ 2). See
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also footnote 5. As for the skills shock, individuals have no idea about either potential
policymaker’s skills in (t + 1). Nor do they know the skills shock of the challenger in
period t, and, therefore, expect 0. However, they can use the incumbent’s period t fiscal
policy to draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t. The expected level of local
public goods of the challenger differs from what is know of the incumbent:
Et[L
b
t+1] = Et[τtt+1 −Dt+1]; (A.5)
Et[L
a
t+1] = Et[τtt+1 −Dt+1] + Et[µat ]. (A.6)
Combining equations (A.1) to (A.6) we can obtain a condition for an individual to vote
for incumbent a (which corresponds to condition (11) in the main text):
Et[µ
a
t ] > αθ
i. (A.7)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (Pr) of any
voter to vote for incumbent a:
Pr[Et[µ
a
t ]− αθi ≥ 0] =
Et[µ
a
t ]− (−α)
α− (−α) =
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
. (A.8)
B Probability of the incumbent to win
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes
in the period t elections. It is the probability that mass 1 of voters, i.e. all voters times
their individual probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as determined in equation A.8)
is greater or equal to 1
2
. The probability for the incumbent to win the election – equation
(12) in the main text – is repeated here:
Prob
{
[
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
(B.1)
Competence extraction mechanism: Voters’ expectation of government competence µat
can be obtained by studying the voters’ perception of the government budget constraint
(9) from the main text which is repeated here:
Lt = τtt +Dt + µ
a
t + µ
a
t−1. (B.2)
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The true competence is:
µat = Lt − τtt −Dt − µat−1. (B.3)
Voters can observe the level of local public goods Lt, previous period competence µ
a
t−1,
and the tax rate τt. Their perception of government competence is, however, also affected
by their expectation of growth and the government deficit policy (which can be concealed,
for instance, by using special government funds and accounting tricks). Hence we obtain
what corresponds to equation (14) in the main text:
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = Lt − τt̂t − D̂t − µat−1
= Lt − τtt −Dt − µat−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µat from (13) or (B.3)
+[τt(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t];
Et[µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = µ
a
t + [τt(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]. (B.4)
Hence the incumbents’ probability of winning becomes (equation 15 in the main text):
Probwin = Prob
{
[
µat + [τt(t − ̂t)] + [Dt − D̂t]
2α
+
1
2
] ≥ 1
2
}
= Prob
{
µat ≥ [τt(̂t − t)] + [D̂t −Dt]
}
(B.5)
= 1 − F [τt(̂t − t) + D̂t −Dt], (B.6)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
Figure B.1: Bell-shaped competence density function as an example
The marked area towards the right (light grey or yellow [if in colour]) under the density
function depicted in Figure B.1 corresponds to the probability described by equation
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(B.5) and by the distribution function representation in equation (B.6). Consider a
recession which is underestimated by voters. Then, the expected competence overall
can be greater than actual competence only if the government’s deficit makes up for
the voters’ underestimation of the shortfall in tax revenue (τt(̂t − t) < 0), plus the
voters’ expected deficit D̂t. Then the probability (see equation (B.6) or the light grey [or
yellow] area under the density function) is always greater than 1
2
and the government’s
chance to be re-elected is increased. The competence perception of voters would also
be increased, if voters fully knew of and believed in the (forecasted) recession and the
government increased the deficit beyond what voters expect. However, if voters could
rationally foresee the recession and the deficit manipulation by the government, then
the manipulation would turn out to be ineffective at the equilibrium.
Using equation (7) we can relate period t deficit to the (t− 1) debt level:
Dt = (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet . (B.7)
The winning probability becomes:
Probwin = 1 − F [τt(̂t − t) + D̂t − (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet ]. (B.8)
C The incumbent’s maximisation problem
Prior to elections, incumbent a would like to maximise her utility over periods t and
(t + 1) by determining Dt (see the timing of events on page 9). She can, however, only
decide on the free component of the deficit Dfreet . Period (t+ 1) utility is the sum of the
utilities for winning and losing the election weighted by the just determined probability.
(Xs is kept constant and discount factor β is set to 1 because it is irrelevant for the
qualitative properties of the results.) Hence, incumbent a’s decision problem:
maxDfreet
V = maxDfreet
V at = maxDfreet
W at + W
a
t+1
= maxDfreet
Eat { u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X }
+ Eat { Probwin [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 +X − (B∗t −Bt)2] }
+ Eat { (1− Probwin) [u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1] } (C.1)
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= maxDfreet
u((1− τ)t) + Lt +X
+ u((1− τ)t+1) + Lt+1 + Probwin [X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2]. (C.2)
where
Lt = τt +Dt + η
j
t ;
Lt+1 = τt+1 +Dt+1 + η
j
t+1;
Dt = (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet ;
Dt+1 = Bt+1 − (1 + r)Bt
= Bt+1 − (1 + r)[(1 + r)Bt−1 +Dt]
= B∗t+1 − (1 + r)2Bt−1 − (1 + r)Dt [government goes for lower limit, footnote 5]
= δ2B∗t−1 − (1 + r)2B∗t−1 − (1 + r)Dt [use equation (5)]
= (δ2 − (1 + r)2)B∗t−1 − (1 + r)Dt.
The first order condition (FOC) is:
VDfreet
= dV
dDfreet
= 1 − (1 + rt) + F ′[τ(̂t − t) + D̂t − (δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1 +Dfreet ]
[X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2] = 0;
⇔ rt = F ′[•] [X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2]. (C.3)
The second order condition for a well-behaved maximisation problem is satisfied.21 So
the FOC determines the government’s optimal deficit Dfreet
∗
.
21 VDfrees Dfrees = − F ′′[•] [X − (B∗t − Bt)2] < 0. The manipulation pushes the critical value of
the F function below mean 0, so that F ′′[•] > 0. Then the sufficient condition X > (B∗t − Bt)2 must,
obviously, be satisfied for a maximising government because winning the elections only makes sense
when the ego rent is not totally eaten up by the reputation loss.
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D Perturbation results
The Implicit Function Theorem is used for obtaining perturbation results. Derivatives
with respect to any variable x of the FOC around the optimal valueDfreet
∗
will be denoted
d dV
dD
free
t
|
D
free
t
∗
dx
=: VDfreet x
. The derivations of the marginal effect of changes in exogenous
variables on the equilibrium value of the government’s optimal choice of deficit Dfreet
∗
are specified below.
For Lemma 1:
dDfreet
∗
dt
= −
VDfreet t
VDfreet D
free
t
= −− F
′′[•] [τ(B∗t−1)t] [X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2]
− F ′′[•] [X − (δB∗t−1 −Bt)2]
= −τ(B∗t−1)t < 0. (D.1)
dDt
dt
=
d[(δ − (1 + r))B∗t−1]
dt
+
dDfreet
∗
dt
= 0− τ(B∗t−1)t < 0. (D.2)
For Proposition 1:
ddDt
dt
dB∗t−1
= −τ ′(B∗t−1)t < 0. (D.3)
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E Preliminary Results on the Empirical Model and
Descriptive Statistics
This subsection presents the results of the ARMAX models for the NUTS III regions, of
descriptive statistics, and of estimations for the relation between initial debt and growth
in fiscal revenues.
TABLE E.1: ARMAX Estimation Results
Region National Forecast AR(1) AR(2) MA(1) Obs. Log P-value
of GDP growth likelihood
Alto Minho 1.004*** -0.170 -0.228 0.049 23 -56.27 0.000
Ca´vado 1.336*** 0.338 0.148 -0.103 23 -53.31 0.000
Ave 0.983*** -0.021 0.179 23 -53.40 0.002
A´rea Metropolitana do Porto 1.569*** 0.940*** -0.137 -1.000*** 23 -51.38 0.000
Alto Taˆmega 0.996*** 0.424* -0.112 -1.000*** 23 -52.65 0.000
Taˆmega e Sousa 1.569*** 0.318 -0.177 -1.000*** 23 -55.81 0.000
Douro 0.735** -1.160*** -0.686*** 1.000*** 23 -56.52 0.012
Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes 1.409*** -0.091 -0.269 23 -55.80 0.008
Oeste 1.534*** -0.446 -0.215 0.529* 23 -53.30 0.000
Regia˜o de Aveiro 1.418*** -0.148 0.042 23 -53.26 0.000
Regia˜o de Coimbra 1.701*** -0.240 -0.094 -0.056 23 -53.38 0.000
Regia˜o de Leiria 1.715*** 0.600*** 0.204 -1.000*** 23 -54.75 0.000
Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es 1.769*** 0.473*** -0.253 -1.000*** 23 -55.90 0.000
Beira Baixa 1.047*** 0.820*** -0.157 -1.000*** 23 -60.68 0.000
Me´dio Tejo 1.448*** -0.330 -0.361* 0.417*** 23 -54.70 0.000
Beiras e Serra da Estrela 1.391*** 0.425** -0.279 -1.000*** 23 -50.55 0.000
A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa 2.042*** 1.135*** -0.369* -1.000*** 23 -59.81 0.000
Alentejo Litoral 2.657*** 0.717*** -0.157 -1.000*** 23 -72.71 0.000
Baixo Alentejo 1.670*** 0.395* -0.137 -1.000*** 23 -65.50 0.000
Lez´ıria do Tejo 1.563*** 0.735*** -0.406 -1.000*** 23 -68.36 0.000
Alto Alentejo 1.129*** 1.022*** -0.660*** -1.000*** 23 -53.50 0.000
Alentejo Central 1.253*** 1.087*** -0.301 -1.000*** 23 -56.92 0.000
Algarve 2.311*** 0.758*** -0.400** -1.000*** 23 -49.56 0.000
Regia˜o Auto´noma dos Ac¸ores 2.150*** 0.483*** -0.520*** -1.000*** 23 -43.41 0.000
Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira 3.423*** 0.622*** 0.122 -1.000*** 23 -74.13 0.000
Notes: ARMAX(2,1) estimations for each region, except for three for which this specification did not converge, and an
ARMAX(2,0) was used instead. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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TABLE E.2: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES Observations Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Primary deficit (real euros per capita) 4,002 -6.05 166.84 -745.00 3,616.92
Election year 4,002 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
GDP Forecast (regional) 4,002 0.31 2.34 -9.46 6.61
Dependency ratio 4,002 35.65 4.18 26.43 51.83
Population density 4,002 297.49 817.42 4.41 7,530.69
Mayor left 4,002 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mayor independent 4,002 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Years mayor 4,002 8.96 7.01 1.00 37.00
Majority 4,002 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
Debt ratio (Gross debt over average current revenues) 4,002 1.58 1.16 0.00 11.49
Excess debt (Debt ratio > 1.5) 4,002 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Excess debt 2 (Debt ratio > 2) 4,002 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Excess debt 3 (Debt ratio > Median debt ratio (1.3)) 4,002 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Sources: DGAL, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and INE.
TABLE E.3: Growth in fiscal revenues explained by initial debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES 1 year 1 year 2 years 2 years 3 years 3 years 4 years 4 years
Debt ratio 0.023** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.011**
(initial) (2.081) (2.680) (2.313) (2.141)
Excessive debt dummy 3.853* 1.975* 1.995** 1.986**
(initial) (1.961) (1.909) (2.172) (2.021)
Regional GDP 0.417* 0.401* 0.499** 0.489* 1.230*** 1.213*** 1.433*** 1.418***
growth (average) (1.701) (1.650) (1.998) (1.961) (3.116) (3.101) (3.205) (3.200)
Population growth -0.854*** -0.864*** -0.845*** -0.855*** -1.262*** -1.269*** -1.351*** -1.353***
(average) (-6.487) (-6.521) (-6.239) (-6.350) (-7.294) (-7.377) (-5.456) (-5.479)
Mayor left (average) 3.130 3.270 2.675 2.761* 1.423 1.481 0.304 0.337
(1.292) (1.324) (1.649) (1.684) (1.292) (1.342) (0.240) (0.266)
Majority (average) 0.090 0.038 0.865 0.804 0.484 0.390 0.626 0.517
(0.103) (0.044) (0.857) (0.801) (0.494) (0.397) (0.572) (0.467)
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,388 3,388 3,080 3,080 2,772 2,772
R-squared 0.078 0.077 0.174 0.171 0.202 0.201 0.238 0.236
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of fiscal revenues over the time horizon indicated at the
top of each column. Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities and years. T-statistics based on standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. The time horizon considered for the initial values and the averages in each estimation is indicated in the title
of the respective column.
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F Additional Results and Robustness and Sensitivity
Tests
This subsection presents the average marginal effects of the election year on the pri-
mary deficit when performing estimations for total expenditures and for fiscal revenues,
the results obtained when using alternative definitions of excessive debt, and those of
robustness tests and of the sensitivity analysis.
Figure F.1: Average marginal effects of the election year -
Expenditures and Fiscal Revenues
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TABLE F.1: Alternative Definitions of Excessive Debt
(1) (3)
Excess debt 2 Excess debt 3
VARIABLES Debt ratio>2 Debt ratio>median(Debt ratio)
Election year 64.822*** 64.418***
(9.672) (7.679)
Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 2.048 0.668
(1.205) (0.416)
Election year * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -10.042*** -7.601**
(-3.650) (-2.209)
Excess debt 27.557*** 21.235**
(2.702) (2.425)
Election year * Excess debt -6.050 -2.676
(-0.283) (-0.180)
Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 10.661*** 8.619***
(3.251) (3.775)
Election year * Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -18.430** -14.470***
(-2.467) (-2.656)
Mayor left -12.853 -12.486
(-1.128) (-1.094)
Mayor independent 32.899 34.568
(1.164) (1.212)
Years mayor -0.864 -0.792
(-1.472) (-1.336)
Majority -0.285 0.265
(-0.025) (0.023)
Dependency ratio -4.896* -4.526
(-1.718) (-1.560)
Population density 0.039 0.028
(1.021) (0.786)
Observations 4,002 4,002
R-squared 0.124 0.123
Notes: Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities, 5-year period dummies, and standard errors clustered by NUTS III
region and year. The definition of excesive debt used in each estimation is indicated at the top of the respective column.
T-statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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TABLE F.2: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluding 4-Year Clustering by National
VARIABLES Vector X Dummies municipality forecasts
Election year 61.367*** 45.846*** 62.903*** 63.297***
(8.688) (5.819) (8.569) (8.998)
Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 24.899*** 25.548*** 23.219** 5.705
(2.805) (2.716) (2.574) (0.531)
Election year * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 3.419 8.014 2.732 20.214
(0.210) (0.491) (0.149) (0.897)
Excess debt 1.730 4.902*** 1.166 -3.725
(1.119) (3.244) (0.734) (-0.807)
Election year * Excess debt -8.128*** -7.479** -7.974** -6.473
(-2.623) (-2.331) (-2.284) (-1.229)
Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 8.936*** 7.957*** 8.976*** 22.111***
(3.427) (3.099) (3.734) (4.015)
Election year * Excess debt * Real GDP growth -17.241*** -17.438*** -17.149*** -37.701***
forecast (NUTS 3 region) (-2.959) (-2.968) (-2.717) (-3.033)
Mayor left -4.919 -4.307 -4.108
(-1.559) (-1.637) (-1.494)
Mayor independent 0.045 0.035 0.029
(1.295) (1.102) (1.032)
Years mayor -10.570 -12.258 -10.667
(-0.908) (-1.127) (-0.978)
Majority 40.526 34.976 37.948
(1.406) (1.229) (1.348)
Dependency ratio -1.019 -0.825 -1.065
(-1.531) (-1.307) (-1.618)
Population density 2.697 0.477 0.715
(0.239) (0.048) (0.073)
Observations 4,002 4,002 4,002 4,002
R-squared 0.121 0.122 0.124 0.122
Notes: Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities, 5-year period dummies (columns 1 and 3), and standard errors
clustered by NUTS III region and year in columns 1 and 3, and by municipality in column 3. Excesive debt is defined as
in Table II. T-statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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TABLE F.3: Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding Excluding Excluding
Azores and formula grants term-limited
VARIABLES Madeira > 50% TotRev mayors
Election year 64.939*** 44.821*** 65.663***
(8.645) (5.653) (6.953)
Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 1.086 3.118* 2.329
(0.666) (1.924) (1.172)
Election year * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -6.807** -11.738*** -8.569**
(-2.234) (-3.319) (-2.090)
Excess debt 22.991** 24.115** 20.509***
(2.402) (2.473) (2.661)
Election year * Excess debt 4.991 6.973 1.033
(0.286) (0.394) (0.058)
Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) 7.605** 7.201*** 6.201**
(2.512) (2.750) (2.163)
Election year * Excess debt * Real GDP growth forecast (NUTS 3 region) -20.011*** -11.893* -15.341**
(-3.077) (-1.869) (-2.305)
Mayor left -4.119 -27.101** -9.012
(-0.338) (-2.050) (-0.809)
Mayor independent 43.817 -21.768 44.870
(1.540) (-0.994) (1.321)
Years mayor -1.124* -0.153 -1.528*
(-1.895) (-0.262) (-1.941)
Majority -0.588 9.528 -5.936
(-0.052) (0.849) (-0.563)
Dependency ratio -5.187* 3.196 -1.959
(-1.689) (0.960) (-0.589)
Population density 0.030 0.038 0.026
(0.900) (1.105) (0.667)
Observations 3,612 2,704 3,349
R-squared 0.122 0.120 0.147
Notes: Regressions with fixed effects for municipalities, 5-year period dummies, and standard errors clustered by NUTS III
region and year. Excesive debt is defined as in Table II. T-statistics based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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